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Brunner on Revelation
By

ROBBRT BERTRAM

ROPESSOll EMIL BRUNNER, the Reformed theologian at the

P

University of Zurich, probably requires little introduction.
He, more than any others of the so-called neo-orthodox theologians from Europe, has fast found his way into American Protestant theological thinking. his books seem to be showing up more
and more frequently even in Lutheran parsonages, and his name has
appeared a number of times in past ·issues of this very journal. This
wide respect which Brunner enjoys is not undeserved. He has been
considerably instrumental in encouraging Protestant theologians to
return to the rock whence they were hewn, to the classical Christian
doctrines enunciated in the Scriptures and reassened by the Reformers. Moreover, Brunner's thought is distinguished by a remarkable versatility and scholarly breadth. AU this, and perhaps a good
deal more, should be said t0 Brunner's great and lasting credit
(especially since what will finally be said about him in this article
is negative and critical) as a warning to those who would wish
tO wave him lightly aside as unworthy of serious attention. There is
no doubt about it, Brunner is a theologian of importance. And
precisely because he is important (and for other reasons coo), his
own theology deserves the same careful, critical concern with which
he himself has theologized.

I
"REVELATION'S" DISTINGUISHING TRAITS

A word which in Brunner's system has attained almost to the

dignity of a blessed word, and one which he has managed t0 reinstate in respectable theological parlance, is the word "revelation."
That with which every Christian theologian has to deal, from
beginning tO end, is, Brunner insists, divine revelation.1 That which
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,accords to the Scriptures their unique authority is their power ID
convey God's icvelation.:a That which entitles Jesus ID be die
Ouist, the divine Mediator, is
office
His
of mediating m 111 die
of God. God's self-revelation}' The impliadoos •
self-disclosure
ramifications of what Brunner means by revelation ue. u oae
would guess. exceedingly intricate. We might. for enmple. DOiie
the ways in which he relates the concept of revelation to tbe mmfold agency of Scripture, Church, and Holy Spirit,' or the ingenious
contrasts and connections which he draws between "reveladoo ml
1
or the distina functions which he assigns tO revelarioa
reason.''
in systematic theology on the one hand and in polemic, or "eristi:,•
theology on the other hand.0 Each one of these areas is an essay
t0pic in itself.
However, there is still another approach which, I think. will
lead us even more quickly and directly t0 an understanding of
Brunner's notion of revelation, namely, to abstraa from that notion those characteristics which, for him, are of the very essence
of revelation itself, those very basic properties which define and
identify revelation as revelation, those fundamenal attributeS without which, according to Brunner, the Christian revelation would
not be what it is. At lea.st four such distinguishing feamres of revelation (although Brunner himself does not explicitly speak of
them as such) may be discriminated. First, this revelation is of
the nature of an encounter between persons: believers arc per·
sonally confronted by a personal God. Second, this revelation is
initiated by a God who transcends absolutely man's capacity ID
know Him, and thus. breaking into mnn's natural "circle of im•
manence" from beyond, revelation is apprehended not by any
human rational deliberation, but only by faith. Third, this ffl'•
elation comes to men in historical events, but in historical evena
which are absolutely unique and are therefore unintelligi1>1e ID
natural human reason. Fourth, this revelntion comes as a "Word";
that is, to those who receive it in faith it is not a meaningless
experience, but rather it makes sense, it has an understandable significance.
In these four distinguishing features we have, I suggest,
an instructive clue to what Brunner means by his key CODCepft
revelation. In the paragraphs which follow we shall elaborate
four features, each in its turn, a little more fully.1

mese
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A. Beve1ation u Penona1 Encounter
Dmae .reveladon, Btunoer rn•inraios, is of the natwe of an encomuer between persons; believers are personally confronted by

• penooal God.'
Mao ii created to live in the peculiarly personal relationships
of trustful obedience to God and of love to his ooghbors. Such
relationships are conceivable only between beings who are persons.
Io fact, it ii his living in just such relationships as these which
defines man u personal. Conversely. because men do not respond
to God and to one another personally, because they have insisted
insread on reducing. by an aa of depersoD11lization1 the "thou"
of God and of neighbor into an abstract, neuter "it," into an impersonal thing. they have thereby fallen short not only of their
own penon-hood, but of their essential humanity, the very destiny
for which they have been intended by their Creator.
Why does Brunner so strongly castigate this depersonalization
as sinful? He seems to have two reasons. One reason is, if I may
so say it, psychological, or subjective, and the other is ontological, or objective. It is sinful psychologically, or subjectively, in
that it reveals man's own proud ambition to be God, his lust
for transforming himself from finite creature into infinite Creator,
his rebellious refusal to be responsible to anyone but himself, his
overweening desire to subjugate God and his neighbors to his own
selfish ends. Stirring within every sinner's bosom is the evil wish
that he, rather than be dominated by God, may himself dominate
God and his neighbors and may bring them into a position where
he can control and manipulate them at will. The most characteristic way in which man uies to accomplish this wish is t0 reduce
God and his neighbors to ideas or concepts in his own mindabstract, intellectualized "its" rather than free and sovereign "thous"
-for in that way he may have them in his own power. No
longer shall they uansccnd his feeble attempts to understand them,
no longer need he be perplexed by their mysterious unpredictability, for now he has captured them by understanding them, by
imprisoning them in the finite categories of his mind, by manipulating them u just so many theological and philosophical propositions.0 He may pretend, yes, he may even deceive himself iota
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believing, that be loves and trum them, but what in &a be Iowa
and trusts are the aeamres of his own intellect. What wu 11111
finite bu by him been made finite, what WU inde6otbJe he 1111
now managed to define. Libido sciffltli, Brunner seems to be -,.
iog, is but the obverse of libido tlominlmtli.
Second, this depersonalization is sinful ontologically, or objectively, since it makes into an it what, ruliJ1, as a maaer of mr
ob;•clnl• f11c1, is not an it. To uuncate a personal thou iDID •
bare conceptualization is not only irreligious and immoral, it is
also untrue. When I have substituted for the God of Abnham,
Isaac, and Jacob some dogmatician's doctrine about God, or whm
I have substituted for you my ideas about you, then I do not mlly
know God and I do not really know you. There is, of counr,
nothing amiss in my regarding a tree or my car or a philosopbial
proposition or even a Beethoven sonata ns an it, as a thing, for
that indeed is what it is. And it may be, Brunner would say, that
as a botanist, or a physicist, or a logician, or a musicologist, I an,
by stystcmatic analysis, exhaust what such a thing means and is.
That is, I have at my disposal as a mtional being the categories for
adequately interpreting such experience. But to deal so with per·
sons, who are not things, is quite another matter. When men,
as they are continually wont to do, gossipingly "explain" their
fellow men in terms of the latters' "guilt feelings" or ".insecuriry,"
as though these fellow men were nothing but elabomtc .rnecbaoial
concatenations of efficient causes, when men conceive of their
neighbors ns mere OCOISions for selfish gmtification, or, what is
· worst of all, when men construe God ns but a guarantee against
their own disappointment or reduce Him to a neuter cosmic prio·
ciple or to an inanimate theological dogma, even though the
dogma be Scriptumlly sound, then men have illegitimately taken
the categories of their understanding-which, to be sure, apply
well enough to "its" - and have applied them to "thous," whm
they do not apply at all. This is to diston what really is into what
is not. Like a good Kantian, Brunner is saying that there are some
experiences ( experiences of things) whose meaning can be ex•
hausted by the categories which are "immanent" within human
reason, and there are other experiences ( experiences of persons)

m
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whme meaning "aanscends" thoselike
categories. And
a good
Angneioiso, '8runner says that the sinful perversity of man's will
leads him also into untruth, int0 a dist0rtion of the very nature
of teality.
A person can be fully known by me only when he wills tO let
me bow him aod only when I in tum will t0 accept him as just
such a &eely willing person.10 An impersonal thing, on the other
band, lib a tree or a logical proposition, does not have that power
of will A person is a center of will who makes his own decisions
aod initiates his own activity, who responds tO others and is responsible for his responses, who can choose either to withhold from
me, or to share with me, his inner being, his sympathies and
ideals. Far from ever being reducible to a mere known "object"
of my thought, he is himself always a knowing "subject," just
as I am. And it is only when I run related to him, not as subject
to object, or as "I" tO "it," but rather as subject to subject, or as
"I" to "thou," that genuine knowledge can transpire between us.
He must decide co disclose himself t0 me, and I must wait and
rely op his decision. For this reason the most profoundly personal
relationships, Brunner maintains, are achieved in love, above all
in forgiving love, where the "thou" gives his very self to me unstintingly and with all his proud defenses down, and where I respond to him with a like love and humility.

This genuinely personal relationship is the ideal not only between men and men, but also between men and God. Indeed it
is most manifest in that relationship of God to His creatures which
Brunner calls "revelation," for here the Most High God, who in
His sovereign freedom is "wholly other" than His creation and
who transcends every presumptu0us human attempt· to reduce Him
to a thinkable object, does now willingly condescend to disclose

Himself to sinful men. By God's merciful decision to reveal His
own Person to our persons through another Person, Jesus Christ,
the vast and unbridgeable gulf which otherwise separates the in.finite God from the finite reach of man's understanding has now
been spanned. In God's appearing to us as Subject co subjects,
rather than as Object to subjects, He has achieved what Brunner
speaks of as the divine-human encounter, or revelation. And His
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revelation of Himself as divine Person overcomes allO die liafa1
to which man is addictm, and ovcmima it (if
we may revert to our earlier distinction) both objectively 11111

depersonalization

subjectively: objectively, by enabling us

to

m:ogmze u pmoaal

what in reality and truth is personal. and subjectively, by JmiD&l1
inspiring in us that trust which desires no longer anopmly ID
subjugate "thous" as "its." .According to Brunner, thi, pendi11:'f
personal confrontation distinguishes what is revelation fmm what
is not.
B. Revelation as Absolutely Transcendent
This revelation, funhennore, is initiated by a God wbo cnmcends absolutely man's capacity to know Him and thus, brakia&
into man's natural "circle of immanence" from beyond, reveladaa
is apprehended not by a human rational deliberation, but ooly

by faith.11
What Brunner seems to be saying here is that there ue some
things which man is capable of knowing. and there ue some
things which man is not capable of knowing, and all this simply
because man is what he is. Just as, we might say, the paper befme
your eyes can reflect light or can displace a certain amount of
space, but cannot digest food or cannot withstand fue simply
because that is the 11t1lt1rc of paper, so also Brunner would •Y•
I imagine, that man's powers and limitations are dictated by man's
1111111re, by what man essentially is. There are certain possibilities
and certain impossibilities which are "immanent," inherent, within
human nature. And this is the "circle" in which man is caupr;
he cannot get outside of it.
Something like this at least seems to be implied in Brunoer's
phrase, the "circle of immanence." Just exactly what, and bow
much, he means by that phrase it is difficult to say. My guess would
be that he is here borrowing heavily from the post-Kantian tradition
in German philosophy; even though he frequently and sharply
criticizes this philosophical tradition, he does seem sometimes to
have allowed that tradition to set the problem for him and ro
prescribe the terminology and the frame of reference within which
he himself operates. If this is so, then what he means by the
"circle of immanence" might amount to something like the fol-
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Jowm& Consider again, example,
as an
the paper at which you
an: looking. and notice the ways in which you, as a human knower,
make ~ out of it and understand it. For one thing. you see
it u mmerhing spread in space from top to bottom and from
side m side, and as being surrounded spatially on one side by the
opposice page and on the other sides by the top of your desk, and
u being closer to your eyes, spatially, than the fioor is and slightly
closer than the desk-top is and not quite as close to your eyes as
your glasses are. In other words, one of the inescapable ways in
which you u a man perceive things is as though these things were
in space, u though things were spatially spread our, spatially
side-by-side with other things, spatially near or far, ere. If you ·
were not a human being, perhaps things would not appear to you
to have spatial relationships, but because you are human, they do.
Or, for another thing, you think of this paper as something which
cun be
by certain qualities; you say it is white and
printed and smooth as though it were 11 subject having certain
prcdicarcs, just as you regard the desk and the fioor and yourself
(a self which is interested or is engaged in reading or is tired)
in the same way. Since 11 man is put together the way he is, he
finds himself trying to understand things by thinking that some
things, like paper, are related to other things, like whiteness and
smoothness, as a substance is related to its qualities or properties.
Human thinking makes these substance-quality connections just
because it is human, and without such connections human beings
supposedly could not think at all. Or again, if after scrutinizing
this paper you are sure that it really is paper, then you are equally
sure that it cannot nol be paper. This is to say that, if a thing
is what it is, then it simply is what it is, and it cannot at the same
time be what it is not. If two-plus-two equals four, then it cannot
also equal five. It may sound self-evident and even silly to so much
as mention this, but perhaps it sounds this way only because this
is one of the most fundamental ways, or the only way, in which
human beings can think at all. Or, finally, suppose that the print
on this page should suddenly become dim and blurred. What
might you do in such 11 situation? You might blink your eyes
and rub them to check whether the dimness of the print might
not be attributed to some deficiency in your vision, or you might
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take off your glasses and re-enrnine them, or you might 'llmlcr
what could have
wrong in the original prioring pmcm.
In any case, what you uc doing is this: you uc looking fm • amr,
for a reason. And if in this case, you could not discover • amr,
you would say: "I don't 11111Urstlltlll this." You proceed that waynamely, to regard some things as symptoms or eHects of cmliD
other things which uc their causes, as things which ieq= m•
tain explanatory reasonsbecause
it is your nature as a human
being to proceed that way. This or something like this, I am IUI'
pting, is what Brunner's form of Kanrianisrn would lad him m
say. In order for a man to know or understand anything at all,
he must, precisely because he is man, understand in cenaio gi.vm
ways. Thin~ must be perceived to be spatial, relatable as submnc:equality, as cause-effect, as subject to the law of identity, or the
law of non-contradiction, etc. These arc the basic, universal thought
forms and categories which are "immanent" in man's very namre.
And his nature, so defined and prescribed, is the "circle" within
which alone he can operate and beyond which he cannot reach
without pretending to be other than human.
But man, being the sinner d1at he is, docs make precisely such
pretensions when he applies the immanent categories of bis understanding where they do not properly apply at all: namely, to God
and to other persons. It is true, of course, that every person is
to some extent also capable of being known in terms of these artgories. You and I - just as the paper in front of you -can be
understood in some measure as existing in space, as substanm
possessing certain necessary qualities, as having our existence and
activity defined by the laws of logic, as being impelled by causes
and explainable by reasons; and perhaps it is even possible in
some small measure to understand God this way ( though only,
Brunner would insist, analogically). However, even after a person
has been reduced in such manner to intelligible form, there is still
a something about him which escapes such reduction, a certain
plus, an inexhaustible surd, which tra,uccnd.s the categories of
human reason. We may understand a great many things, even a
great many true things, about, say, Martin Luther; but to under·
stand him thus, we admit, is not the same as really knowing him
personally.
Similarly, even after a man may understand intellec-

sane
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mally that "God is a Redeemer," he may sdll not be able to say,
"God is "'1 Bedeemcr." 12 Knowledge about God is not yet acquaiarwoce with God; believing about God is not yet believing in
God. .Mao, not because he is a sinner, but simply because he is
man. just is not equipped to achieve a genuine intellecual apprebeasion of the living God. 1bc finite categories which are
immanent in human understanding, however capable they may
be in other theaters of operation, are not made to grasp the rransceadent meaning of God. While Brunner fixes tenaciously upon
this absolute separation
"transcendence"
between God's
and man's
"immaneace," he describes the separation, not in the traditional
sfMIMl a:rms of a "heaven above" and an "earth beneath," of
"nature" aad "supernature," but rather in the 11pis111mological terms
of the knowable and the unknowable.
If, therefore, we are to know God at all, He must break in
upoa our "circle of immanence" from beyond, and we must respond
to Him in some way other than by understanding Him. This
other way is faith. Faith is the humble willingness to accept God
Himself without imposing on Him the immanent categories of
our understanding, without insisting on reducing Him to nn object of our thought, recognizing thereby that God, who is a
sovereign and transcendent Thou, has come into intimate fellowship with us without for a moment ceasing to be n trnnscendent
Thou. Faith, Brunner sometimes says, is trustful obedience. It is
our decision rrustingly to be obedient to the transcendent God
rather than distrustingly to insist that He be obedient to the thought
forms immanent in out finite human natures. By means of such
trustful obedience, and only by means of it, am men apprehend and
be apprehended by God's revelation.
C. Revelation as Unique Event
Revelation, Brunner also says, comes to men in historical events,
but in historical events which are absolutely unique and therefore
unintelligible ro natural human reason.13
What evidently lies in the back of Brunner's mind at this point
is an age-old philosophical question which asks: How is it possible
to know that which is singular or individual? When, for example,
you look at the page in front of you, you recognize it to be a page
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only because you have had previous experience of other pap ia
the past. You say to yourself: This object before me is like dae
other objects in the past which were called pages, tbaefcxe mis
object, too, must be a page. If, however, you bad never hid mch
previous experience of other pages, then you would not know mac
this object here and nowa is page. This object would. in mac
case, be for you completely unique, singular, individual. You
would have no other similar objeas with which to compare ir,
and so you could never know what it is. It would be completely
meaningless. But surely, you say, it would mean som11hmg to ~
Could you not, for example, at least recognize that it is "whiie"'
and "smooth" and "printed" and "rectangular?" Not unless whiieness and smoothness and all the rest had been known tO you in
some prior cognition. Only if you had cogn.izcd whiteness befott,
could you ~ecog11ize it when you encounter it now. Conversely, if
you experience some object or happening which you have neffl',
never experienced before, not even in a previous existenee. as
Socrares might suggest, nor by way of innate ideas, then it would
simply be impossible (or so it would ~m) for you to recognize
what this experience, here and now, means. It would be unin•
relligible, meaningless. Ir is evidently events and experiences like
this which Brunner designates as "unique" or cinmalig. .And those
events which are unique absolutely, he would s.-iy, are inapable
of being understood by natural human reason.
The only events, however, Brunner would say, which arc unique
absolutely and without qualification arc the events in which God
discloses Himself to men through His Mediator: the events, that
is, of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the
ensuing events in which this Mediator encounters believers in the
O1urch through His Holy Spirit. These may properly be described
as "events," for they happen in time and space just as any other
historical events, like the Bartle of Waterloo or like your reading
of this journal. But they differ from other historical events in that
they are entirely unique and singular. They have no counterpart
wharsoever in general human experience. When God personally
disclosed Himself to men in Jesus Christ in first century Palestine,
there was no precedent in the whole of human history with which
men could compare this utterly novel experience; and so men were
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not at all capable of disceming what it meant- by means of their
naaual reuoo, for natural .reason cannotsense
make
of what is
absolwely unique. Likewise, when this same God addresses Himself m believers, through His Holy Spirit, in second-century Rome
or twelfth.century Gaul or twentieth-century America, they cannot by their natural .reason recogna.e what this experience means
by comparing it with some similar event
ordinary
in
human experience, u they do for example when they rccogna.e a page or
whiteness or smoothness; for there simply is no event in ordinary which
compares with or resembles this coming
human experience
of the Holy Spirit. This coming is entirely einmalig, and hwnan
reason is utterly at a loss to understand it.
Nevertheless, no matter how unique these events may be, some
human beings do manage to understand them and grasp their significance: those human beings, that is, who are believers; for if
there were no understanding. no meaning, to accompany these
events, they could hardly be called the "events of 1'er1cl111io11,."
And we shall see in the next paragraph how Brunner attempts
co make this point clear. However, before we pass on to that
point, we ought to remind ourselves how persistently Brunner has
emphasized that revelation is the work of a wholly transcendent
God and is not at all the product of the finite, creaturely human
reason. This recurrent contrast between transcendence and immanence seems to be at least one of his dominant motifs. It appearm first in his insistence that revelation, since it is an encounter
between persons, cannot be apprehended by human understanding,
for human understanding can deal only with impersonal things.
We noted the same theme in his saying that revelation is not
humanly intelligible, since God is not subject to the categories
which are immanent in man's reason. And now, finally, Brunner
says the same thing in another way: since man is incapable of
understanding that which is unique or singular, and since God's
self-revelation appears in events which are unique absolutely, therefore revelation cannot be apprehended by natural human knowledge. In fact, so rigorously has Brunner held divine revelation co
be beyond the grasp of rational understanding that some of his
critics fear he is forced, finally, to fall back upon a kind of irrational religious experience (cf. his view of faith and personal en-
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counter), which smacks dangemusly of "mysacism• and emhaOUlDOt rightfully be aid to yield IIIJ
intelligible content, any uademancling-but
only feeling

siasm and which tbete&xe

D. Revelation as a ''Word"

By way of countemcting this danger of irradoo•lisrn in bis dieology of revelation, Brunner asserts that revelation always coma
as a "Word"; that .is. to those who receive it in faith it is not a
meaningless experience, but rather it makes seose, it has an understandable significance.u
One of the specters that has always haunted Emil Brunner is
Schleiermncher, and it is a specte~ which Brunner has tried vehemently to exorcise. Against "dia M1s1il!'1 he has coosiscmdy
opposed "J,u Wort." Brunner, however, does not intend this Won!
to be identical with the Scriptures. for no scripture, no collecdoo
of concepts and words- as we saw earlier is able to ezbausr
the meaning of the divine-human encounter. is able to be the
revelation itself.1G But at the same time Brunner is just as eager
to point out that the revelation, while it may not be idenacal
with concepts and words, is nevertheless very closely bound up
with them. Revelation, he insists. is not mystical experience, it is
nor some vague, inexplicable religious feeling. When God addresses us in His revelation, He does say something. Belicms
can point to the revelation and can note that it says this 1111d nor
that. And what it says is conceptualized in the thoughts of Apostles and Prophets and believers and is expressed linguistically in
and creeds and prayers and theological doctrines. While
Scriprures
these Scriptures and doctrines cannot be said ro b• the rcvela·
tlon. still there is no revelation 11,Pnrl from them. "Ohne die
lehre ist die Sache niche da." These conceptual and linguistic
symbols of the Scriptures and of theology are not, as Brunner
would understand Schleiermacher ro have said, merely arbiauy,
poetic imagery for symbolizing an inchoate religious· feeling. Rather
has this revelation occurred in historical events which, no maner
how unique they may have been, or how personal, were yet capable
of being interpreted in speech and in writing. Io one of his amcb
upon mysticism, it is precisely because "faith in Christ is peam·
nently bound up with those objective facts, with this Book, and

https://scholar.csl.edu/ctm/vol22/iss1/52

12

Bertram: Brunner on Revelation
11.UNND. ON UVELATION

887

with this him>rical fact'' that Brunner feels justified in concluding:
"'l'bere is no Fimdemental clistinc:don between faith ancl theology,
u mere is between mystical religiosity ancl theology." This .is so
since revelation bas always the character of Word. Just es words
ue wbicles for communicating meaning between man and man,
so also does
in
role as Word communicate
meaning between God and man. The Word of revelation is revelation in
meaningfulness, in its logical significance.
Bw: Brunner himself, in spite of his insistence on revelation's
logical meaningfulness, does seem to sense that this insistence
raises some difliculties in the light of some of his other, contrary
Sllllmlents.

divine
its
its

Since he does not always bother to spell out these

dif&culties, perhaps we should do so. If, for instance, divine revelation is essentially a relationship between persons who caMot
be reduced to impersonal abstractions in thought, and yet if this

personal revelation must be subsequently expressed in just such
impersonal abstractions as Scripture and dogma, how is this opposition between personal revelation and impersonal idea to be
resolved? Or, if God transcends absolutely the categories which
are immanent in our understanding, requiring for our response to
Him a faith which is not an ace of our intellect, then how shall
we explain the connection (which Brunner believes tO exist) between this absolutely transcendent God and our ideas about Him e. g., our idea about Him as "Person"? If the statement "God is a
Person" can be said to be at all true, even if it is only true analogietlly, then the human concept "'person" may be said to be in some
sense applicable to Him. But if it is in any sense applicable to Him,
then He does not transcend it absolutely. Or if the revelatory
events are unique - not relatively unique like ordinary historical
events, but absolutely unique - and if absolutely unique -events
are as such unknowable, then how is it that they do yet yield a
meaning which can be known, and which, when stated in theological propositions, can be said to be true? Here BruMer, borrowing from Kierkegaard, makes the interesting suggestion that
the meaning and the truth of the event are apprehended, not by
comparing this event with other, similar events (for there are no
other, similar events), but simply by personally participating in
the event itself. When I respond to this historical Jesus Christ
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in fllilh, the full implications of what He means and ii. dapae
His absolute uniqueness and singularity, become intelligjbl.e ID me.
But apart &om His "happening to me," there is for me acithcr
meaning nor truth. As Brunner says: 1bis is truth which happens- "gnuortlma Wllhrhn1.11 But while all this may be ~
foundly uue, it solves Brunner's difticulty, I beline, oo1y apparently, only by an inept confusion of the word "uuth." 11 When
he says, a.t first, that an absolutely unique event cannot be made m
yield "truth," he is speaking of the kind of theoretical truth which
aaaches ro logical propositions - the appropriate reladoosbip.
in other words. between a proposition and the object m which
refers. it
~ut when he speaks of the "truth which happens." he
refcrrirf& ro the appropriate relationship, not between logia)
is
propositions and intelligible objects_ but between one Person and
another person, which he elsewhere calls faith. It may be entirely
proper to employ the word truth in both these senses, and perhaps
in some other senses besides, but once that is done it is no longer
admissible to use the word as though it always meant tbe same
thing. These are some of the difficulties in which Brunner is involved by his attempting to conceive revelation, on the one hand,
as personal and absolutely transcendent and unique, and on the
other hand, as intelligible "Word." Some of these difficulties be
himself acknowledges. His answer, at one point, is:
We will allow the mystery-in all reverenceto remain a mystery: but that does not exempt
us from the necessity of making an effort ro
understand as much of it as we can.17
seem

While such candor and humility are commendable indeed, it does
that the "mystery" of which Brunner here speaks and which
he regards with "reverence" is, partly at least, a mystery of bis
own making. And when, in his famous lectures at the Lutbenn
University of Upsala, he faces this same problem and suggacs
that the divine, personal, transcendent, unique revelation rm.y be
"in, with, and under" the concepts and words - as Christ is n:Jaud
sacram.entally to the bread and wine 11 - i t does then seem dw
Brunner, for all his candor, has attributed to his own seij-made
difficulties a dignity and mystery which they do not quite desem.
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II
A CamCAL EsTIMATB

A. An Bocangling Alliance with Philosophy

The '"mystery" which plagues Brunner's theology of revelation
might well turn out to be, upon further examination, a mystery
which derives not so much from the complex, ineffable nature
of revelation itself as from the peculiarly philosophic11l way in
which Brunner has stated his problem. To be sure, there is mystery

wi

Christian doctrine of revelation. But
aplenty coDDCCtcd
this is not the mystery which Brunner here has on his hands.
Rather, it seems, he has allowed himself to become entangled in
a problem which concerns, not primarily the knowledge of revelation and faith, but human knowledge generally. And he has
accepted at face value, more or less, the formulation which this
problem bas asswned in a particular philosophical tradition.

The questions, for example: "How do we know persons?" and
"How may such interpersonal knowledge be reconciled with our
knowledge of non-personal things?" are questions which, far from
being peculiar to Christian theology, have perhaps received just
as much, and more, attention from non-theological philosophers
and psychologists. This in itself, of course, need not prevent theologians from also entering inro the discussion, so long as they
bear in mind that the problem is not resuicted to the issue of
Christian revelation. But it is precisely at this point that Brunner
has emd. He has fixed upon the general epistemological distinction between personal and non-person:il knowledge; and noting
chc technical difficulties which philosophy has had in accounting
for the former, he concludes that this philosophically inexplicable
knowledge of persons is peculiar ro divine revelation and is the
proper subject matter of Christian theology and ethics. And from
rhis he has gone on to say, in effect, that the transcendent God
is transcendent, at least partly, beca11s
e He is a person. (This is
cmainly different from saying that God uanscends our knowledge
somewhat lik, persons do.) One practical implication of this
would be that if the non-theological sciences should ever succeed
in adumbrating some of the difficulties of interpersonal knowledge
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(which Brunner would probably
deny have to
;,, ~ ) , then
God's transcendence would to that extent be impaired. And far
that matter might it not be possible, even now already, ID c:oamae
the peculiar situation of interpersonal knowledge in such • way
that we arrive at a conclusion which is directly opposed m Bmoner's? Might v.:e not conclude that an impersonal thing like •
tree, because it is not a person, is not l•ss uansccndmt of oar
understanding, but mora uansccndent- for a tree, since it docs
not have the personal power to communicate its inner being to
me, can never, never, be known by me, whereas a person an at
least decide
communicate
to
himself to me? However, apart &om
the merits of such a suggestion, it seems that Brunner bas inadvisedly left the fate and fortune of his theology of reveladoo in
the hands of the philosophers. (Which is precisely what be wanrs
most of all not to do.) .And what has been said about his undue
dependence on philosophy with respect to the knowledge of penoos
applies equally well to the knowledge of unique hisrorial emus
and experience
to the
of things which transcend the irnrn•oent
categories of our understanding.
B. Misplaced Emphasis on Divine Tmnscendence
But an even more serious shortcoming in Brunner's clocuioe
of revelation is one which is not philosophical, but distinctly theological. It is a shortcoming, in fact, which attaches ID his mo
of the entire God-man relationship and to his view of sin and salvation, and it extends its weakening influence, therefore, beyond the
doctrine of revelation, throughout Brunner's whole theological
system. This shortcoming consists, briefly, in his misplaced Reformed emphasis on the absolute separation between 6niie, ma•
turely man and the wholly other, sovereign God. It should not
be thought for a moment that such an emphasis on God's sovereign
tmnscendence is unimportant for Christian theology; on the contrary, it is exceedingly important, especially today when theologians
seem to be continually tempted to forget ir. The difficulty in
Brunner's theology, however, is that this emphasis on God's aanscendence is misplaced; it is given such a precedence and predorn·
inance overcardinal
other
doctrines ( like the doctrine of God's
justifying grace) that these doctrines lose their characteristic genius
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and power. Not the least of these doctrines to be

Ht
10

affected is

Branaer's doctrine of revelation.

Our previous discussion bas sufticiently shown us that Brunner's
nodon of revelation is cast, from beginning to end, in terms of
mosccodeac:e-immanence. Because this revelation is an encounter
between persons, because it is not intelligible to man in his circle
of immllDCDCC, because it is mediated in events which are entirely
wuque, because even in its character as meaningful Word it is a
mys=y, it is, throughout, a revelation to us from a God who is
wholly other. And man's chief sin, in the face of this revelation,
is accordingly his proud unwillingness to accept his finitudc, his
creatureliness, and his desire to diminish the transcendent majesty
of the wholly other God. Sinful man atrophies into an abstract
"it" the God who is a sovereign, personal "Thou." He subjects
to the cntcgories of his own understanding the God who has
created that understanding and who eludes its grasp altogether.
He regards the absolutely unique events of revelation as but particular instances of a geneml revelation which is going on always
and everywhere. He identifies God's Word with the words of men
or loses it in his own mystical religiosity. And, finally, the most
marvelous aspect of d1is divine revelation is that in it the great
divide between God and man, which is ex hypothesi unbridgeable,
is miraculously bridged- a pamdoxical contradiction of the logical
and ontologicnl law: Pi11i111m 11011, capax in/i11i1i.
Brunner's concern, in his docuine of revelation, is of course not
onZ, with the matter of tranSCendence-immanence. As he frequently
says, be is opposing a dynamic view of revelation to a static, intcllectualistic view, ahistory-centered
faith-centered and
revelation to an all-knowing, unhistorical philosophical idealism, a
Word of revelation to an irrational mysticism. But each of these
emphases, it will be noted, sponsors in turn Brunner's larger emphasis on God's sovereign transcendence. It may seem suange to
raise this charge against the Brunner who is so widely known for his
own criticisms of Barth's extreme docuine of uanscendence. But
while Brunner has, in his own theology, modified Barth's ext:rcmism
(in a way which, for all its theological and philosophical ineptitude,
seems more honest than Barth's), still these very modifications have
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consisEently rmtered in, and been shaped by, the selfllme pml,lem of uamceodence and iroro•oca:.
This, as was suggesu:d earlier, is an eccentric placing of emplluil.
and it obscures the rmttal motif of the Oristian 1DCSS&ge: God's
grace. This is not t0 suggest mat Bnmjustifying and
ner means t0 minimize this motif-far from it! -nor, for that
matter, that the doctrine of justification can be maintained widiout ample room for God's transcendent holiness. However, a
theology which directs first attention to the doctrine of "jmdfiarion
by faith through grace alone" tends also to regard such maam
as sin, salvation, and revelation differently than Brunner. If such
a theology does still speak of pride as man's root sin, it is not .,
much the pride of a man who attempts arrogantly to surmount
his own finirude, but rather it is the pride of a man who wills
above all to be pious and thus to be worthy of God's aa:q>taDCe.
And when such a theology marvels at the miracle of salvation, it
discovers God's deep love, not so much as His deigning to overcome
His "transcendence" to disclose Himself to us in our "immanence"
( which of course is marvelous indeed), but rather in His desisting
from the legal demands and judgment which are our just desert
and in His sacrificially, mercifully, forgiving our sins. And when
such a "justification by grace" theology discusses revelation, it is
not first distracted by the metaphysically oriented questions: How
can the finite possibly contain the infinite? How can the saaamenml bread possibly contain the Lord's body? How. can the absolutely unique possibly be known? How can the words powl>ly
contain the Word? Such a theology makes short shrift of these
questions by replying, perhaps almost flippantly, that these apparent impossibilities are indeed possible- "in, with, and under."
For the realm of the possible is defined not simply by what genenl
human experience has found to be possible, bur, quite nominalisby what God has actually willed and done. .And this can
tically,
be said without either Battening out the metaphysical mysteries
involved (as Fundamentalism would do) or deliberately flouting
all rules of consistency, for the "first truth" of Christian theology,
with which pre-eminently all other theological truths must be
consistent, is
that God, who is above all a God of love, does through
His Son enter into the world and come very near to us.
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